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ABSTRACT 
Public safety first responders deal with life and death emergencies, natural disasters, 
school shootings, trauma created by lone shooters and major events, yet have not enabled 
members from the private sector, business owners, school administrators, and other 
public safety stakeholders to participate fully in the mitigation or prevention of these 
events. At no time in this nation’s history is the public more attuned to the potential 
threats in the homeland, and simultaneously, willing, wanting, and able to be part of the 
solution.  
This thesis outlines proactive case studies that demonstrate the ability to share 
public-safety sensitive and law enforcement information in a safe, secure, and timely 
method with those who can help first responders make a difference and keep this 
country’s communities safer.  
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DEFINITION OF TERMS 
 Public Safety Answering Points 
Public safety answering points (PSAPs), Communication Centers, or emergency 
dispatch centers, are configured in a wide variety of sizes and capabilities, dependent 
primarily on the sizes of the jurisdictions and communities in which they serve. Some 
communication centers are standalone PSAPs and one of the better-known examples of a 
standalone center is the Los Angeles Police Department dispatch center. Call-takers field 
law enforcement requests for service and send the information electronically to the 
dispatchers working across the center. The City of Phoenix has a well-regarded fire 
dispatch center; these configurations serve those communities and executive officers of 
those agencies best. 
Smaller centers may not have the call volume that the previous two urban call 
centers handle but the employees work as hard, answering telephone calls for service 
while simultaneously entering information into the dispatching system, dispatching first 
responders via radio, and managing the customer walk-up counter at the police 
department.  
 Computer Aided Dispatching Systems 
“Law enforcement agencies use computer aided dispatch systems (CAD) to 
facilitate incident response and communication in the field. CAD systems, in many cases, 
are the first point of entry for information coming into the law enforcement system. 
Typical CAD system functions include resource management, call taking, location 
verification, dispatching, unit status management, and call disposition.  
“Additionally, mapping functionality, interface with mobile data computers 
(MDC), and interfaces with other external local, state, and federal information systems 
 xiv 
may be included. Call-takers, dispatchers, and their supervisors are primary users of 
CAD.”1 
 9-1-1 Telephone Systems 
“The establishment of a single, three-digit telephone number for citizens who 
require immediate police assistance, emergency medical aid or fire suppression. With the 
advent of the E-911 telephone system that automatically routing the caller to the closest 
PSAP. The telephone system interfaces with CAD to make the determination as to which 
police, fire or EMS agency is closest to the emergency.”2 
                                                 
1 “Law Enforcement Information Technology Standards Council (LEITSC),” The Police Chief, 2014, 
http://www.policechiefmagazine.org/magazine/index.cfm?fuseaction=display_arch&article_id=1199&issue
_id=62007. 
2 “9-1-1 History,” Louisiana National Emergency Number Association, accessed July 10, 2014, 
http://www.louisiananena.org/911history.asp. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
Call centers, also known as Public Safety Answering Points (PSAPs), are the public’s 
first point of contact with public safety authorities during emergencies.1 To the layman, 
the nation’s 9-1-1 system is a single network that connects communities across the 
country. This concept is perpetuated by television crime dramas whose writers 
unintentionally provide misinformation to eager and captivated audiences on a daily 
basis.  
In reality, 9-1-1 systems are stove-piped networks that serve specific regions, 
communities, and jurisdictions; no nationwide system exists. Counties or metropolitan 
areas with large communities may have several PSAPs whose employees work for a 
variety of municipal and county organizations. Fortunately, and in spite of the fragmented 
system, emergency telephone services are available to 98% of the American population2 
and the centers are connected to one another via an aging telephone network of central 
offices, copper wire, and analog switching stations. 
Most PSAPs also serve as emergency dispatch centers, and America’s dispatchers 
are often referred to as the lifeline between emergency responders and the public3
 
for it is 
the call-takers and dispatchers who coordinate the emergency caller with the first 
responders who will ultimately assist the public. PSAP employees are the first of the first 
responders. This nation’s PSAPs are rich with information collected from citizens 
requesting emergency assistance, processed by call-takers, summarized, prioritized, and 
utilized to dispatch first responders to emergency and non-emergency situations. The 
primary mission of PSAP employees is to help people on what they may perceive to be 
their worst day. In the author’s opinion, gained from more than 20 years of personal 
                                                 
1 “9-1-1 Call Centers/PSAPs,” Federal Communication Commission, Public Safety and Homeland 
Security Bureau, accessed May 14 2014, http://transition.fcc.gov/pshs/psaps.html. 
2 “Homepage,” National Emergency Number Association, 2014, http://www.nena.org/?. 
3 Michelel McConnaha, “Week Recognizes Hard Work of County’s 911 Dispatchers,” Ravalili 
Republic, April 15, 2014, http://ravallirepublic.com/news/local/article_1e3cab92-c508-11e3-b7d1-
001a4bcf887a.html. 
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experience, PSAP employees do amazing work in less than ideal circumstances, which is 
often difficult, stressful and challenging, and invisible to the public. 
Once events are mitigated and first responders have left the scene to return to 
headquarters to file their reports, all the updated information is archived in databases and 
is rarely reviewed again. The data, in aggregate, could be exploited to identify patterns, 
trends, and clusters of incidents, which could be leveraged to identify among other key 
issues, public safety and or traffic hazards, patterns of illegal use of narcotics, trends in 
firearm related violence, and patterns of fraudulent insurance claims. Each of these issues 
has collateral impacts on a community, the public, and those first responders who serve 
them.  
These same bits of information, breadcrumbs that succinctly and chronologically 
describe events happening in and around United States (U.S.) communities, can be 
leveraged to improve the situational awareness of the community public safety 
stakeholders, including business owners and school administrators. The United States has 
more than 9,600 PSAPs4; each operates unique equipment and utilizes non-standardized 
policies and procedures. Police chiefs, fire chiefs, and sheriffs who control and manage 
dispatching operations manage them differently. The one operational issue consistent 
from one PSAP to another is that chiefs and sheriffs prefer not to share information with 
other agencies.5 
This research explored several case studies that have improved public safety by 
sharing information with public safety stakeholders, school administrators, and business 
owners. As described in this thesis, some projects were more effective and cost effective 
than others; however, they share the common goal to share PSAP-based information. 
This thesis determined that through sharing information with trusted public safety 
stakeholders and networks, communities could collaborate more effectively with law 
enforcement agencies to reduce crime, and at the same time, improve working 
relationships. 
                                                 
4 “Homepage.” 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Many after-action assessments of critical events and emergencies have concluded 
that communication breakdowns lead to significant performance failures, unnecessary 
loss of life, and loss of property. After action reports of the Columbine High School 
shooting,1 Hurricane Katrina,2 9/11,3 and Super Storm Sandy4 are examples of such 
reports highly critical of inter-agency and inter-department communications, and each 
document offers recommendations for improvement, largely around communication 
breakdowns. The common theme in the after action reports is that responses to 
emergency situations have historically not been effective due to the lack of effective 
coordination and communication between agencies and departments. Problems include 
lack of interoperability due to radio devices, inconsistent radio protocols, incongruent 
policy, and a clear chain of command.5  
In spite of government reports recommending agencies share information more 
effectively, over the past two decades, these functional communication and information 
sharing gaps have shown no measurable improvement. Such crises do not improve with 
the passing of time; therefore, critical emergency communications must be immediate, 
crisp, timely, and accurate.  
Federal, state, and local information sharing and intelligence development 
remains mission focused for the home agency, not the overall mission. The 9/11 
                                                 
1 Kieran Nicholson, “Columbine: Training Before Massacre ‘Flawed,’” Denver Post, September 23, 
2000, http://extras.denverpost.com/news/col0923.htm. 
2 Robert Miller, Ph.D., “Hurricane Katrina: Communications & Infrastructure Impacts,” in the 2006 
Conference Threats at Our Threshold (Washington, DC: National Defense University, 2006), 192. 
3 Andrea Stone and John Rudolf, “9/11 Commission Recommendations on First Responder Network, 
Civil Liberties Unmet 10 Years after Attacks,” Huffington Post, September 9, 2011, http://www.huffing 
tonpost.com/2011/09/09/911-commission-recommendations-unmade_n_950896.html. 




Commission directive stating, “…the importance of an integrated, all inclusive effort to 
‘connect the dots’ is a national objective” remains an admirable goal for more than ten 
years following the 9/11 attacks.6
 
Few would object that communications and collaboration between agencies and 
public safety stakeholders must improve and that the public and private sectors are key 
partners to keeping this nation secure. Thus, what prevents public safety officials from 
sharing information with other first responders and non-traditional public safety 
stakeholders? 
Excellent examples of information sharing systems are available that function 
optimally with adequate security measures by credentialing and trusting authorized users 
without risking the safety of first responders, victims of emergencies, and simultaneously, 
maintaining the integrity of criminal investigations. 
The Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI) participated in several information-
sharing initiatives in 2011. It continues to promote appropriate sharing and collaboration 
with the goal of protecting the United States and defeat national security threats while 
preserving the privacy and civil liberties of U.S. citizens. A report presented by the FBI 
chief information sharing officer (CISO) summarizes and characterizes the many 
information-sharing activities currently engaged in by the FBI.7  
The year 2012 was marked by significant change within the FBI regarding 
information sharing and safeguarding. In response to numerous challenges 
and potential threats, the FBI took steps to more effectively and efficiently 
share vast amounts of information with Law Enforcement and Intelligence 
Community partners, as well as to better protect sensitive information to 
preserve the integrity of operations while ensuring the privacy and civil 
liberties of U.S. persons.8 
                                                 
6 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2004), 208. 





B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research is linked to the author’s work as the director of a large urban public 
safety answering point (PSAP) interested in improving the information exchange between 
centers, federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, state fusion centers, business 
owners, and school principals.  
Can information sharing between PSAPs, and federal, state, local, and fusion 
centers improve? Should a conceptual framework be adopted and operated under that 
addresses policy, trust, social, technology, and funding barriers? Can information flow 
upward from the municipal level to the state and federal levels?  
Information collection in the American PSAPs consists of more than merely 
information gathering about public safety events, such as burglaries, structure fires, and 
medical emergencies. Buried in the hundreds of hundreds of thousands of telephone calls 
received in PSAPs are potential indicators of significant criminal and potential terrorist 
events. Should this information be culled and analyzed if the collection and sharing of 
information across the spectrum of law enforcement, public safety agencies, public safety 
stakeholders, business owners, and school administrators could improve national security, 
create a safer community and improve the safety of the American people?  
Senate and House legislation similarly create mechanisms for oversight of 
information-sharing procedures to protect privacy and civil liberties and place limitations 
on the use of the cyber threat information shared with the government. For example, the 
Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) requires annual reports from the 
intelligence community inspector general. The Lieberman-Collins Cybersecurity Act 
requires an evaluation by the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board (PCLOB), and 
annual reports from chief privacy and civil liberties officers and relevant agency 
inspectors general.9 
                                                 
9 “Cyber Security Task Force: Public-Private Information Sharing,” Bipartisan Policy Center, 
Homeland Security Project, National Security Program, 2012, http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/ 
Public-Private%20Information%20Sharing.pdf.  
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Although the Strengthening and Enhancing Cyber-security by Using Research 
Education10
 
(SECURE IT) Act did not pass, it proposed biennial evaluation from the 
PCLOB, the agency or department heads overseeing cyber security centers,11 and annual 
reports from agency inspectors general.12 Admittedly, it is an ambitious objective. 
Known barriers prevent information sharing between federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies and PSAPs. Fiscal, policy, control, trust, risk, governance, and 
technical issues need to be assessed and mitigated. Perhaps the biggest barrier is the 
cultural barrier that many agencies experience, “have never done it that way.” 
Is it possible that other state and federal projects can be leveraged or modeled to 
create an information-sharing environment? The creation of the Joint Terrorism Task 
Force (JTTF) to break down information-sharing roadblocks that can exist between state 
and federal law enforcement agencies has been considered a step in the right direction. 
The JTTF reviews active cases being handled by local and state agencies.  
A measure of success is to comply with the recommendations from the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, The National Strategy for 
Information Sharing (NSIS), “As the terrorist attacks on transportation infrastructure in 
London and Madrid demonstrate, critical infrastructure can be a prime target for the 
transnational terrorist enemy we face today. The private sector owns and operates an 
estimated 85% of infrastructure and resources that are critical to our Nation’s physical 
and economic security. It is, therefore, vital to ensure we develop effective and efficient 
information sharing partnerships with private sector entities.”13 It is time to include the 
fusion centers and the private sector to the table; by using data from PSAPs, it is possible 
to improve the amount of information sharing from the local level.  
                                                 
10 “Strengthening and Enhancing Cyber-security by Using Research, Education, Information, and 
Technology Act of 2012,” American Public Power Association, accessed September 8, 2014, www. 
publicpower.org/files. 
11 Bipartisan Policy Center, Homeland Security Project, National Security Program, Cyber Security 
Task Force: Public-Private Information Sharing. 
12 Ibid. 
13 “Sharing Information with the Private Sector,” The National Security Council, accessed August 25, 
2014, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/nsc/infosharing/sectionV.html.  
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C. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Research for this thesis follows three approaches: a literature review to 
summarize federal guidelines for information sharing initially developed immediately 
following 9/11, and subsequent documents describing best practices and interpretations 
of information sharing from public and private sectors. The second is a review of best 
practices, risks, and the cost benefits to be considered when implementing an 
information-sharing model. The third presents four separate case studies that have 
demonstrated a variety of success, wide range of costs, types of technology implemented, 
and sustainability issues.  
A review of return on investment is included in the assessment. As with most 
projects, an unending supply of resources and funding is most invaluable. This study 
considers the cost of implementation and the on-going maintenance costs. The level of 
effort to implement is also a critical decision-making factor for most agencies, as many 
PSAPs do not have dedicated staff members who can create, install, monitor, 
troubleshoot, and enhance products designed to receive data and forward it to other 
systems for further dissemination.  
D. BIAS SENSITIVITY 
In psychology, heuristics are simple, efficient rules that people often use to form 
judgments and make decisions. They are mental shortcuts that usually involve focusing 
on one aspect of complex problems while ignoring other aspects. These rules work well 
under most circumstances, but they can lead to systematic deviations from logic, 
probability, or rational choice theory.14 
“Rational choice theory is the view that people behave as they do because they 
believe that performing their chosen actions have more benefits than costs. That is, 
people make rational choices based on their goals, and those choices govern their 
                                                 




behavior.”15 Data sets, presented in clear and understandable manner, should be 
developed that demonstrate the desired outcome can be achieved by using simple 
information strategies and credentialing trusted and secure networks. Trust does not come 
easy but this nation must be willing to create an environment that helps law enforcement 
understand the objective, how it benefits the agency and the community, and most 
importantly, that law enforcement has a say in how the process is affected.  
The resulting errors are called cognitive biases. Many different types have been 
documented that have been shown to affect people’s choices in situations, such as valuing 
a house or deciding the outcome of a legal case. These choices are not necessarily based 
on fact but often based on prior experience or comfort levels with the current decision-
making methods and the pre-desired outcome. Another way to describe it is, if it is not 
broken, don’t fix it. 
In the early 1970s, psychologists Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman 
demonstrated three heuristics that underlie a wide range of intuitive 
judgments. These findings set in motion the Heuristics and Biases research 
program, which studies how people make real-world judgments and the 
conditions under which those judgments are unreliable. This research 
challenged the idea that human beings are rational actors, but provided a 
theory of information processing to explain how people make estimates or 
choices. This research has guided almost all current theories of decision-
making.16 
Although a significant amount of research has focused on how heuristics lead to 
errors, they can be seen as rational in an underlying sense. According to this perspective, 
heuristics are good enough for most purposes without being too demanding on the brain’s 
resources. Another theoretical perspective sees heuristics as fully rational in that they are 
rapid, can be made without full information, and can be as accurate as more complicated 
procedures. By understanding the role of heuristics in human psychology, marketers and 
                                                 
15 “Rational Choice,” Chegg.com, 2014, http://www.chegg.com/homework-help/definitions/rational-
choice-49. 
16 Wikipedia, s.v. “Heuristics in Judgment and Decision-Making.” 
 7 
other persuaders can influence decisions, such as the prices people pay for goods, or the 
quantity they purchase.17 
As a manager of several PSAPs during the past 12 years and having worked in 
this industry for more than half of his life, the author considers himself to have a strong 
understanding of the technological requirements and the operational considerations of 
operating a contemporary PSAP. The author recognizes that he may have some inherent 
cognitive and rational choice biases based on professional experience, training, and 
education. Having spent time in the private sector delivering 911 services and data in real 
time, the author has observed that these types of technical projects, when funded properly 
with employees who possess the required competencies, can be delivered quickly and 
effectively in the public sector. The author is aware of his biases and has worked 
diligently to recognize when these biases present themselves during the research. 
                                                 
17 Ibid. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review identifies information resources relevant to the assessment 
of the nation’s PSAP ability to gather potentially important public safety-related 
information from millions of callers, and automatically forward the information and data 
to state fusion centers, public stakeholders, school administrators, business owners, and 
other state and federal agencies for analysis. Various publications and project 
documentation describe the tactics, strategies, and best practices in the area of public 
safety information sharing including academic research conducted on the topic of 
information sharing between PSAPs and other public safety stakeholders. For these 
projects to be successful, business rules for information sharing must be established and 
agreed upon by all participants. This literature review identifies three types of 
information and research resources regarding the sharing of information between federal, 
state, municipal, and media entities. 
A. STUDIES AND REPORTS BY THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 
A significant amount of literature exists about information sharing between the 
federal government and municipal entities, which clearly demonstrates that the body of 
knowledge supports a top down methodology of information sharing. In other words, 
much of the literature discusses in detail how intelligence flows from the federal level to 
the state and down to the municipal level. This is not to say that the problem of 
information sharing has been resolved, for it has not. What is missing is research and 
discussion of bottom up and peer-to-peer information sharing. 
America faces a dynamic and constantly changing national security environment 
in which nation states, talented non-state actors, domestic lone wolves, and transnational 
entities continue to use technology and information to create opportunities to exploit the 
national security networks. The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) describes a new 
paradigm in the war on terror. 
“Rapid technological change and dissemination of information continue to alter 
social, economic, and political forces, providing new means for our adversaries and 
 10 
competitors to challenge us.”18 The public sector must be engaged in any rapid change of 
direction affected by the government or a requirement for information.  
Residents call 911 when they are injured, observe crimes, fires, and witness 
critical events. The Aurora Cinema19 attack in Aurora, Colorado, on July 20, 2012, and 
the Boston Marathon Bombings20 in Boston, Massachusetts, on April 15, 2013 are recent 
examples of the types of critical events in which PSAPs were the initial point of contact 
and crucial in the emergency and multi-agency tactical response. Had the incident 
commander been notified immediately of these incidents, it is possible that the 
intelligence gathering could have begun at earlier phases of these events. 
Consider the recent shootings at the Washington Navy Yard in the District of 
Columbia, even as the suspect was being identified, Americans heard “No piece of 
information is too small,” from Valerie Parlave, deputy assistant director in charge of the 
Washington, DC FBI office.”21 Parlave demonstrates the importance of information 
irrespective of its apparent insignificant. PSAPs have mountains of categorized data that 
can literally become a forensics expert’s goldmine.  
Improved bottom up information sharing warrants further research, as 
demonstrated by Parlave’s call from the community to be on alert and seeking the 
assailant, “Communication breakdowns between military, federal and local law 
enforcement complicated the search for the gunman during Washington Navy Yard,”22 
according to a District police report stating police officers were unable to access live 
video of the shooter as they stormed into harm’s way. “…the U.S. Navy failed to tell 
                                                 
18 “The National Intelligence Strategy,” Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009, 
http://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nis2009.pdf.  
19 Tom Foreman, “A Timeline of the Colorado Theater Shooting,” CNN.com, July 20, 2012, 
http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2012/07/us/aurora.shooting/index.html. 
20 “Updates on Boston Marathon Bombing,” Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), August 2013, 
http://www.fbi.gov/news/updates-on-investigation-into-multiple-explosions-in-boston. 
21 Barbara Starr, Catherine E. Shoichet, and Pamela Brown, “12 Victims Slain in Navy Yard Shooting 
Rampage; Dead Suspect ID’d,” CNN.com, September 16, 2013, http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/16/us/dc-
navy-yard-gunshots/index.html. 
22 Peter Herman and Clarence Williams, “Confusion Marred Police Response to Navy Yard 
Shooting,” The Washington Post, July 11, 2014.  
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local police commanders that a video feed from 160 cameras in the corridors where 
Aaron Alexis, 34, opened fire could be accessed from a room just inside the building.”23 
During the response after action, it was learned that too many officers were self-
deployed to the scene in an effort to help. For all their good intentions, their presence 
overcrowded the scene, which made it difficult to maintain chain-of-command, and 
officers were unable to command the field force effectively. Commanders were 
communicating on a variety of radio channels. When they were on the same radio 
channel, they talked over one another. Command vehicles blocked tactical pathways for 
officers, and according to a report issued by the Navy, “there was confusion among some 
responders—and even top officials—about who was in charge.”24 This confusion could 
have been avoided with a communications tool directing officers where and when to 
respond. The incident commander did not have the ability to manage the incident 
effectively.  
The self-deployment issue continues to plaque law enforcement and other first 
responder communities, and complicates all aspects of the response, including the 
fundamentals of incident command. Self-deploying officers without direction from the 
incident command could be resources that might be needed in another aspect of the event, 
and by reporting to the active scene could actually compromise responder safety when 
appearing in tactical zones at which they are not expected.25  
The same problem occurred in Boston during the public safety response to the 
Boston Marathon bombings. During the post-incident assessment, the question of self-
deployed officers was raised, as it related to the shooting of the campus police officer 
maintaining a perimeter in Cambridge. Investigators were unable to determine whether 
the officer was killed by friendly fire.  
                                                 
23 Herman and Williams, “Confusion Marred Police Response to Navy Yard Shooting.” 
24 Ibid. 
25 “National Incident Management System. Resource Management and Complex Incidents,” Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 2010, http://training.fema.gov/EMIWeb/IS/IS703A/06_IS703_ 
SM_Aug2010.pdf. 
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We had so many self-deployed officers, we don’t know where the bullets 
from all of those guns came from,” the source said. “In such a confused set 
of circumstances, with so many local, state and federal police folks there, 
there was very little coordination, and each of those agencies has a 
different set of policies and different set of training, so altogether it’s 
amazing no innocent person was killed.26 
Relevant and contemporary literature begins with an overview of a Department of 
Homeland Security program titled, If You See Something, Say Something™. This public 
awareness campaign is intended to “raise public awareness of indicators of terrorism and 
terrorism-related crime and to emphasize the importance of reporting suspicious activities 
to the proper authorities, by calling 911.”27 Since PSAPs are the de facto points-of-
contact for the communities that adopt the If You See Something, Say Something program, 
PSAP employees must be prepared to meet the expectations of the community, 
customers, and program administrators.28 
The 9/11 Commission Report framed the failures that led to 9/11. It identified a 
key structural failure of the intelligence community, both before and after 9/11, as the 
organization of national intelligence around the intelligence “collection disciplines of 
home agencies,” which makes it impossible to connect the dots due to a lack of integrated 
information.29 A review of a public safety information-sharing project in New York State 
focused on information sharing and endorsed the citywide network that connected law 
enforcement agencies with federal agencies. Public safety leaders created the “public 
sector knowledge networks” (PSKNs) that worked to “treat information and knowledge 
                                                 
26 Phillip Martin, “‘Self-Deployment’ May Have Caused Confusion during Boston Marathon Bombing 
Manhunt,” WGBH Online, October 16, 2014, http://wgbhnews.org/post/self-deployment-may-have-caused-
confusion-during-boston-marathon-bombing-manhunt.  
27 “If You See Something, Say Something™,” Department of Homeland Security, August 20, 2013, 
http://www.dhs.gov/if-you-see-something-say-something%E2%84%A2-campaign. 
28 Ibid. 
29 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report, 408. 
 13 
sharing across traditional organizational boundaries as a primary purpose as they try to 
address public needs that no single organization or jurisdiction can handle alone.”30 
The NSIS31 states, “information sharing should be the rule, not the exception,” 
and that the information-sharing environment will not be constructed overnight, but will 
evolve over time. The NSIS was created with the understanding that homeland security 
information, terrorism information, and law enforcement information related to terrorism, 
can come from multiple sources, all levels of government, as well as from the private 
sector. The directive makes it clear that information should flow “top down” but also 
“peer-to-peer and bottom up.” 
The 108th Congress enacted the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act32 of 2004, which was legislation to reform the intelligence community and the 
intelligence-related activities of the U.S. government. Fostering information sharing is a 
core Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mission. Specific relevance of the PSAP 
roles is found in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in Subtitle C–
National Preparedness,33 which outlines the public safety role in national preparedness, 
interoperability (section 7303), critical infrastructure (section 7306), and readiness 
assessments (section 7306).34 The question at this point is whether the nation’s PSAPs 
are capable of connecting to the secure information-sharing networks.  
                                                 
30 Sharon S. Dawes, Anthony M. Cresswell, and Theresa A. Pardo. “From “Need to Know” to “Need 
to Share”: Tangled Problems, Information Boundaries, and the Building of Public Sector Knowledge 
Networks,” Public Administration Review 69, no. 3 (May/June 2009): 39–402, http://onlinelibrary.wiley. 
com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2009.01987_2.x/full. 
31 Department of Homeland Security, “National Strategy for Information Sharing, Successes and 
Challenges in Improving Terrorism-Related Information Sharing,” Information Sharing Environment, 
October 2007, http://www.ise.gov/sites/default/files/nsis_book.pdf. 
32 “National Strategy for Information Sharing and Safeguarding,” The White House, December 2012, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2012sharingstrategy_1.pdf. 
33 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108–458, 118 Stat. 
3638 (December 17, 2004), codified at 42 U.S.C. §2000ee, 50 U.S.C. §403-1 et seq., §403-3 et seq., §404o 
et. seq, accessed August 24, 2013, http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-108publ458/pdf/PLAW-
108publ458.pdf. 
34 Ibid.  
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Congress and President Obama have made it clear that one of DHS’s core 
missions is to create the technological and organizational infrastructure necessary to 
promote the sharing of information regarding terrorism, homeland security, law 
enforcement, weapons of mass destruction, and incidents of all types within the DHS 
realm, across the federal government, and with state, local, tribal, territorial, private 
sector, and international partners.35 Many of the capabilities exist but the mindset of 
public safety leaders, for the most part, has yet to change. 
The 9/11 Commission Report36 made numerous recommendations to improve 
information sharing, and in 2011, the DHS published a report on the status of 
implementing the recommendations from the 9/11 Commission Report. The follow-up 
report provides a glowing review of work completed to improve information sharing, but 
makes no reference of bottom up information sharing despite recognizing that security 
begins with hometown security: “Over the past several years, DHS has strengthened and 
evolved our homeland security enterprise to better mitigate and defend against dynamic 
threats. This approach is based on the simple premise that homeland security begins with 
hometown security.”37 Examples of information gathering from the local level are scarce. 
“Simply put, DHS is focused on assembling information and sharing it across the country 
in a way best designed to protect the homeland.”38 
The National Response Framework (NRF)39 describes the delivery of 
“coordinated, prompt, reliable, and actionable information to the whole community 
through the use of clear, consistent, accessible, and culturally and linguistically 
appropriate methods to effectively relay information regarding any threat or hazard.” 
                                                 
35 “Information Sharing Strategy,” Department of Homeland Security, 2008, http://www.dhs.gov/ 
xlibrary/assets/dhs_information_sharing_strategy.pdf. 
36 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report: 
Final Report. 
37 “9/11 Commission Recommendations, Progress Report,” Department of Homeland Security, 2011, 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/implementing-9-11-commission-report-progress-2011.pdf. 
38 Ibid. 
39 “The National Framework for Strategic Communications,” The White House, 2009, http://www.fas. 
org/man/eprint/pubdip.pdf.  
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Missing is a strategy or recommendation to move information and data from front-line 
information gatherers upward to federal, state information analysts, or peer-to-peer.40 
The NIS41
 
August 2012 warns that state, non-state actors will have an increasing 
impact on this nation’s national security. Many of these actors have attempted to deploy, 
or have deployed, strategies that have direct impacts on the commerce and well-being of 
the residents of U.S. communities, such as the release of pandemics, improvised 
explosive devices, school shootings, or wild land fires.42 PSAP employees are the first of 
the first responders and have the responsibility to not only gather information quickly, 
and dispatch first responders, but also to share critical information promptly with state 
fusion centers and state and federal partners. 
The Patriot Act43 directs the sharing of information inter-agency cooperation 
among government agencies. The Patriot Act removes the legal barriers that prevented 
the intelligence community (IC), law enforcement entities, and military stakeholders from 
collaborating when working to ensure the safety of the American people. A spokesperson 
from the Department of Justice (DOJ) stated, “now police officers, FBI agents, federal 
prosecutors and intelligence officials can protect our communities.”44 Yet, no structured 
mechanism is in place for sharing information from the front lines or with the front lines.  
B. ACADEMIC LITERATURE 
In the book, Megacommunities, the authors present a compelling argument for 
federal, state, and local entities to collaborate with private sector and municipal entities to 
identify and resolve increasingly complex security issues. The concept is based on the 
studies in the fields of group dynamics, network theory, behavior, and in the service of 
the goal of sustained solutions to problems, “that no single organization or methodology 
                                                 
40 “National Response Framework,” Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), 2013, 
http://www.fema.gov/core-capabilities#IntelandInfo.  
41 “The National Intelligence Strategy.”  
42 Ibid. 




can solve alone.”45 The argument is sound as no silver bullet exists to fix the 
information-sharing conundrum for all communities, but it should serve as a model to 
encourage communities and law enforcement to begin to build a patchwork of 
information-sharing networks, and create proofs of concept models that other 
communities can adopt.  
Mark Lowenthal’s work explains in great detail how information should be 
gathered to contribute to the intelligence gathering process. 
 “Requirements 
 Collection 
 Processing and exploitation 
 Analysis and production 
 Dissemination 
 Consumption 
 Feedback”46  
Lowenthal states that information is not intelligence; rather gathering is a critical 
aspect of the intelligence cycle that must be completed so that information can be sent to 
IC for analysis. Increased amounts of information increase the level of effort of finding 
truly important intelligence.47 Information and data come from a variety of sources and 
each need to be given credence, and not summarily dismissed based on the source. 
“Given the nature of the intelligence cycle and the segmented organizational structure 
used to perform it, knowledge sharing among agencies is necessary to produce good 
intelligence.”48 Information from PSAPs can be sent to fusion center analysts who can 
                                                 
45 Mark Gerencser, Reginald Van Lee, Fernando Napolitano, and Christopher Kelly, 
Megacommunities: How Leaders of Government, Business and Non-profits Can Tackle Today’s Global 
Challenges Together (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), 18. 
46 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 5th ed. (Los Angeles: SAGE/CQ Press, 
2012), 57. 
47 Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 62. 
48 William J. Lahneman, Keeping U.S. Intelligence Effective, The Need for a Revolution In Intelligence 
Affairs (Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2011), 187.  
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then develop reports and publish the reports not only to the PSAP providing the data but 
those agencies within the same proximity of the events; those most likely to be impacted 
by the findings of the fusion center.  
Jennifer Simms states in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, “the heart of 
intelligence, then, is not in the plumbing for getting raw data from the collector to the 
appropriate user. It is rather the enabling of appropriate action over time.”49 The 
objective is to move information into the pipeline for further analysis. Those agencies 
that provide information or raw data to the fusion centers are the exception. Fusion center 
employees may have one or two sources at each agency on whom they can depend but 
the information flow is inconsistent and limited.  
James J. Wirtz, Dean at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), School of 
International Graduate Studies, states that globalization and the information revolution 
will make collaboration between agencies easier; it will also make the challenges of 
keeping up with the flow of information more difficult. “The barriers are breaking down 
between intelligence practitioners and scholars.”50 Wirtz reiterates that information does 
not flow easily across the bureaucratic boundaries, even against well-understood threats, 
and good intentions of sharing information. Information should be disseminated to a state 
fusion center or a similar entity at which it can be evaluated and determined whether it 
represents actionable information that can result in a product or a tip. This dissemination 
is not happening across the county.  
C. STUDIES BY THE MASS MEDIA  
“Information Sharing in the Era of Social Media,” an article published in 
Homeland Security Magazine,51 discusses the pros and cons of using social media to 
                                                 
49 Jennifer E. Sims, Transforming U.S. Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 
2005), 27. 
50 James J. Wirtz, “The Sources and Methods of Intelligence Studies,” Naval Postgraduate School, 
Center for Homeland Defense and Security, 2012, https://www.chds.us/coursefiles/NS4156/lectures/intel_ 
sources_methods/player.html.  
51 Chris Russo, “Information Sharing in the Era of Social Media,” 9-1-1 Magazine.com, July 2011, 
http://www.9-1-1magazine.com/ELERTS-Russo-Information-Sharing.  
 18 
notify shopping centers, large commercial facilities, schools, and universities of nearby 
emergencies. The concept can be difficult for PSAP managers and first responders to 
embrace, as the methodology steps outside the routine processing of calls for service, but 
PSAP employees must be able to publish information that will reach the most people as 
quickly as possible. “As emergency managers, PSAP employees have the opportunity to 
make dramatic changes in the way we do business.”52  
D. SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
Adequate literature is available to conduct meaningful research on the 
information-sharing capabilities, policies, and practices of the nation’s PSAPs. A variety 
of technologies is available; some proprietary and some open source that could enable the 
information sharing in the bottom up methodology described earlier. It is time for the 
American PSAPs to step into the 21st century and leverage relationships and existing 
technologies to help keep America safe by being part of the information continuum.  
What is surprising is the relatively small number of programs utilizing simple 
programs to share information. When agencies do share information, it generally goes 
right back up the stovepipe as opposed to peer-to-peer or to public safety stakeholders, 
such as schools, businesses, and corporate partners.  
                                                 
52 Russo, “Information Sharing in the Era of Social Media.” 
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III. INFORMATION SHARING FROM THE PSAP  
A. BENEFITS OF INFORMATION SHARING  
Information and knowledge are vastly different; information is the basis for 
knowledge, yet knowledge is required to interpret and understand information.53 
Information sharing must go beyond the simple exchange of data. The Information 
Sharing Executive (ISE) was established in the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence (DNI) to establish and affect information sharing protocols; however, the 
mindset of local law enforcement is slowly changing from the collective mindset is “need 
to know” to “need to share.” 
Admittedly, the primary duties of the nation’s PSAPs are to gather information 
from callers, summarize the information into concise and crisp details, and dispatch the 
closest and most appropriate first responders as promptly as possible. The question then 
becomes is it feasible to expand the responsibilities and duties of PSAP employees not 
only to receive information and dispatch emergency responders, but to also become 
active participants in the intelligence cycle by forwarding potentially actionable data 
breadcrumbs to fusion centers and other state and federal partners?  
Many computer aided dispatching systems (CAD) have the capability to forward 
information automatically to other systems, which in turn, can, automatically develop 
reports and forward information to records management systems (RMS), jail 
management systems (JMW) or other entities. PSAP employees do not have the 
responsibility to analyze the data, nor do they have the time to do so.  
Creating and maintaining an information-sharing environment has many benefits. 
It provides access to neighborhood resources and current program information, such as 
information about public safety threats. Environmental and societal issues, and 
                                                 
53 Thomas Davenport, David DeLong, and Michael Beers, “Successful Knowledge Management 
Projects,” Sloan Management Review (Winter 1998): 43–57, https://www.ischool.utexas.edu/~i385q/ 
readings/Davenport_DeLong-1998-Successful.pdf. 
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information-sharing networks create an environment for developing trust.54 Yet, despite 
the generic police practice of instructing people to call 911 when they need help, by law 
enforcement is hesitant to involve the community in fighting crime or sharing 
information related to crime. In short, the local law enforcement entities need to lean into 
preventing, observing, and reporting crime, as opposed to responding to the scene after it 
has occurred.  
B. PROBLEMS WITH INFORMATION SHARING 
Publishing and sharing information can be problematic; law enforcement agencies 
may be leery of sharing information that might compromise the integrity of an 
investigation or crime scene. Law enforcement officers need to protect active crime 
investigations to preserve the integrity of evidence collection and the evidentiary chain of 
custody for subsequent prosecutorial action.  
Sharp lines of authority are drawn between the government branches, including 
federal, state, and local agencies, and those boundaries are pervasive, embedded, and are 
in fact, the way business is conducted in most law enforcement environments. The 
process appears flawed and chaotic to those standing on the periphery, although to those 
who operate daily in this paradigm, the system works well, as long as the user requires 
information only from the home agency. Information is used to barter position and 
power, and sharing information is considered bad form in some entities.55  
Another problem with information sharing is that stakeholders may not share a 
common understanding of business practices, jargon, nomenclature, or may not have a 
clear understanding or meaning of the data. While the required action to take may be 
clear to one agency, the messages may not exist in the lexicon of other agencies.  
                                                 
54 Matthew S. Kraatz, “Interorganizational Networks and Adaption to Environmental Changes,” 
Academy of Management Journal 41, no. 6 (1998): 621–43; Walter W. Powell, “Hybrid Organizational 
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Economic Research, July 1995. 
55 Dawes, Cresswell, and Pardo, “From “Need to Know” to “Need to Share”: Tangled Problems, 
Information Boundaries, and the Building of Public Sector Knowledge Networks.” 
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Data can be interpreted differently through inexperience, or unfamiliarity with the 
manner in which it is collected, stored, and distributed. The transference of data and 
information must be done consistently and congruently with end user education and 
instruction in the use of the data.  
A complete and common understanding of the information can only come after an 
exchange of theory, practice, policy, terminology, analysis, and presentation. William 
Bratton was instrumental in the development of a now widely used police agency 
accountability tool developed by the New York City Police Department, known as Comp 
Stat crime reviews. Crimes were tracked by precinct, and commanders were summoned 
to headquarters to explain the changes, or lack of changes, in crime patterns. What was 
initially viewed as a bureaucratic annoyance translated into improved information for the 
officer on the beat, improved performance, and ultimately, a reduction in crimes. The 
image of New York City improved to become one of the safest large cities in the world 
because the police department developed a common language, common metrics, and held 
officers accountable.  
Bratton framed his argument well, “Your vision needs to be broad enough to 
appeal to a variety of people and organizations. You can’t be all things to all people. But 
you need to be something to enough people to come together and make their aspirations a 
reality.”56  
C. CONTEMPORARY BARRIERS TO INFORMATION SHARING 
Barriers to information sharing occur in a variety of combinations: Governance, 
policy, and legal issues prevent the ability for agencies to collaborate and permit the free 
flow of information from public safety agencies to public safety stakeholders.57  
                                                 
56 William J. Bratton and Zachary Tumin. Collaborate or Perish!: Reaching across Boundaries in a 
Networked World. (New York: Crown Business, 2012). 
57 Todd R. La Porte and Daniel S. Metlay, “Hazards and Institutional Trustworthiness: Facing a 
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Cost factors also create barriers to information sharing across jurisdictional 
boundaries, as agencies do not want to incur costs for a partering entity, especially those 
that may have competing agendas and missions. 
Sharing information can lead to the perceived loss of control, breaches of 
confidentiality, and a lack of inclusion in decision making. Trust, or the lack of trust, is 
another inhibitor to information sharing. Work cultures, values, and relationships often 
define the outcomes of information sharing. When trust is low or non-existent, the flow 
of information is hindered, and efforts are increased to prevent any exploitation of shared 
information, which is the opposite of collaboration.58  
Risk is inevitable and inherent in knowledge and information sharing, which 
impedes the free flow of information. Privacy, security, storage, authority, the release or 
the potential for the release of information, and confidentiality breaches, create a 
potential for risk. The definition of risk may vary between entities. This difference also 
adds to the disagreement of risk and decreases the trust in the relationship. 
Arguably, the most difficult aspect of establishing information-sharing networks 
or systems is the development of governance and policy between agencies. It is fair to say 
that the higher the number of participating agencies contributing information to the 
knowledge base or system, the higher the complexity of the project doctrine. Certainly, 
some legal framework for sharing information is prudent and networks that have well 
defined expectations seem to operate more effectively and for longer durations. Roles and 
responsibility, fiscal responsibilities, resource allocation, and administrative tasks should 
be clearly defined in the project governance, memorandums of understanding (MOU) or 
letters of agreement (LOA). 
D. PRIVACY ISSUES 
Since 9/11, the FBI has transitioned from crime-fighting to an intelligence-led, 
threat-driven organization that is guided by clear operational strategies. “The FBI works 
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to predict and prevent the threats we face while at the same time engaging with the 
communities we serve. This shift has led to a greater reliance on technology, 
collaboration, and information sharing.”59 
Effective information exchange is a requisite for the success of the unique 
FBI national security and law enforcement missions. Dynamic operations, 
a shifting policy environment, and improvements in technological 
capabilities characterized the FBI in 2011, reinforcing continued need for 
broad, agile, but secure information exchange. The FBI is committed to 
sharing timely, relevant, and actionable intelligence with the widest 
appropriate audience while protecting the privacy and civil liberties of the 
American people. It is also committed to making the best possible use of 
information these partners share with the FBI. The FBI continually 
promotes an information-sharing culture, deploys new technologies, and 
refines its policies and procedures in support of its commitment.60 
E. THE CHALLENGES OF DEVELOPING AN EFFECTIVE 
INFORMATION SHARING MODEL 
Therefore, these questions remain, what barriers exist that prevent first responders 
from adopting the mindset of “need to share?” What is the currency they need to buy into 
the system? How do public safety stakeholders, school administrators, and business 
owners build trust with the local and state law enforcement agencies? Will this public 
sharing actually help to keep this nation’s schools and malls safer? 
The difficulty of information sharing is rooted in the long-standing history of 
traditions, the need to control, leadership ego, hubris, and outmoded business rules. The 
idea of sharing information with non-traditional business partners is completely contrary 
to the manner in which public safety has done business for decades. The concept 
challenges current command and control systems, the values and the missions of public 
safety leadership teams that have been founded in military models, and paramilitary 
leadership models. 
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Trust, risk, cost, liability, breaches of confidentiality, and the fear of change can 
all be components of the hesitation. Other reasons for this hesitation deserve to be 
illuminated and discussed in an academic setting. Are the challenges too great? 
F. ESTABLISHING A NEW PARADIGM 
Today’s leaders must innovate and utilize existing technology to help improve the 
safety and security of the homeland. First responders may use social media or similar 
technologies to inform schools and neighborhoods of recurring problems, or at the 
minimum, repurpose existing technologies so that the learning curve is reasonably rapid. 
In so doing, various elements can be actively engaged and have a participatory role in 
their own safety as well.  
Federal agencies increasingly use recently developed Internet technologies 
that allow individuals or groups to create, organize, comment on, and 
share online content. The use of these social media services, including 
popular Web sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube and provides 
opportunities for agencies to more readily share information with and 
solicit feedback from the public. However, these services may also pose 
risks to the adequate protection of both personal and government 
information.61  
The General Accountability Office (GAO) has outlined rules and regulations for the 
government to follow and the risks that come with utilizing social media. 
G. CURRENT STATUS OF PSAP INFORMATION SHARING  
Residents have expectations that they will receive prompt service from first 
responders. Yet, law enforcement agencies are hesitant to share public safety information 
with public safety stakeholders, and allege that doing so could compromise public safety, 
jeopardize crime scenes, or impact investigations. The truth is that sharing information 
facilitates improve information collection and speed of response,62 and integrated 
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information-sharing systems provide citizens with access to information and services. 
Landsbergen says “positive information sharing experiences can help government 
professionals build and reinforce professional networks and communities of practice.” 
Communities of practice are people who share concerns and learn how to do it better as 
they interact regularly.63 
Law enforcement agencies will demand that information-sharing systems must be 
managed with high degrees of security and credentialing. This thesis also supports the 
availability of technologies to extend information to non-traditional public safety 
stakeholders, including school administrators and business owners without risking first-
responder safety. Deploying these technologies can enhance school safety, alert mall 
security personnel to nearby emergencies in an effort to keep the public safe, while still 
meeting the security requirements required by state and local law enforcement 
communities. For example, the vetting of public safety stakeholders by law enforcement 
personnel can assure that adequate credentialing, training, testing, and auditing is 
conducted on a routine basis, while at the same time, public safety stakeholders can 
become law enforcement force multipliers by enhancing situation awareness for trusted 
partners.  
The question then is it feasible to expand the responsibilities and duties of the 
PSAP employees not only to receive information and dispatch emergency responders but 
also to become active participants in the intelligence cycle by forwarding potentially 
actionable data breadcrumbs to fusion centers and other state and federal partners? If 
these duties cannot completed by an already busy PSAP employee, can information 
sharing be conducted in a timely manner? 
Organizations large enough to own and operate contemporary 911 CAD systems 
have access to emergency information via an application programming interface (API). 
An API, defined by PC Magazine, is an interface that when implemented, provides 
linkage to a required computer function to be executed. “…an API implies that a driver or 
program module is available in CAD to perform a system operation that be linked into an 
                                                 
63 Etienne Wenger-Trayner, “Communities of Practice: A Brief Introduction,” Wenger-Trayner, 
accessed November 14, 2013, http://wenger-trayner.com/theory. 
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existing program to perform computer tasks.”64 In layman’s terms, an API is a spigot that 
can connect CAD systems to other systems to share information. To leverage the API, 
organizations need access to a CAD system administrator and a resource that can parse 
the desired data and process it by another program, such as a neighborhood notification 
system, Excel, or Crystal Reports.  
The decision not to share is a conscious decision public safety leaders make, 
based often on prior experience, skills, heirloom knowledge, information gaps, legacy 
policy issues, risk, and the difficulty of operating in the new paradigm of sharing 
information with people who are not police officers. The shift requires law enforcement 
officers to recognize that community stakeholders, school officials, and business owners 
are indeed as equally, or more, vested in the safety and security of the community. 
However, information-sharing programs do involve cost.  
                                                 
64 “Definition of API,” PC Magazine, Encyclopedia, accessed August 15, 2014, http://www.pcmag. 
com/encyclopedia/term/37856/api.  
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IV. COST OF COLLABORATION 
Costs are most certainly associated with collaboration, as potential partners come 
together with established expectations, real or imagined, and the hope to create a situation 
better than the status quo. Give and take occurs in the negotiations, the operation and the 
maintenance of the public safety dispatching systems, and information collection system 
maintained by public safety and private sector entities. “Every collaboration has its own 
currency. It might be money, job advancement or prestige; it might be the deep 
satisfaction of a mission accomplished, a job well done, a world made better.”65 The 
currency of PSAP information sharing is the delivery of situational awareness, and for 
some of the public safety stakeholders, the collaboration impacts the safety of families 
and the security of this nation’s communities.  
Lastly, emergency notifications broadcasts cannot be left to public safety 
personnel. Any event that would require a notification broadcast is also an event that will 
very likely keep the team members occupied managing the tactics of the operation and 
working to keep first responders and citizens safe. A personal observation is that these 
types of notifications were made late, after the fact, or not at all. As Pete O’Dell says in 
his book, Silver Bullets, “humans are the weak link in information sharing.”66 The 
latency of information sharing from PSAPs is often the human element.  
Agencies considering migrating to or adopting an information-sharing platform 
must consider the intended use of for sharing the information. If the need to share is 
immediate, then the better solution is to develop an automated platform. If the 
information is less urgent, then an ad hoc reporting/information-sharing platform may be 
the best solution. 
 
                                                 
65 Bratton and Tumin, Collaborate or Perish!: Reaching across Boundaries in a Networked World. 
66 Pete Odell, Silver Bullets: How Silver Bullets: How Interoperable Data Will Revolutionize 
Information Sharing and Transparency (Bloomington, IN: AuthorHouse, 2010), 13. 
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V. INFORMATION SHARING STANDARDS 
Sharing data can change the world. The web, at its root, is simply a 
standard protocol for data and virtually the whole network as we use it 
today from a similar source. Successful data standards come to be taken 
for granted, but building them takes work, foresight, and both technical 
and political leadership. 
—Gary Wolf, Contributing Writer Wired Magazine 
For the purpose of this thesis, information-sharing standards are defined as 
documents that describe technical specifications and criteria used as “guidelines, rules 
and characteristics, definitions to work toward consistency and predictability in the use of 
data.”67 
A. STATE OF MINNESOTA, METRO GIS POLICY BOARD 
The State of Minnesota, Metro Geographical Information Systems (GIS) Policy 
Board, is one of the earliest standards-setting organization for information sharing. It 
established a set of guidelines and standards for those entities working with addresses,  
because many datasets are geographically referenced by an address. 
Defining and using a standard address format will increase the ease with 
which these datasets can be incorporated into the GIS for mapping and 
analysis. In addition, because addresses are so often used as a means of 
communication between and within organizations, standardizing addresses 
will increase an organizations ability to share these datasets with other 
organizations. Standard addresses can also increase the efficiency of 
automated applications. For example, standards may make locating 
addresses on an E-911 system more efficient and accurate or usable over a 
wider area covering several communities.68 
B. NATIONAL EMERGENCY NUMBER ASSOCIATION  
The National Emergency Number Association (NENA) is an organization that 
works to standardize the management, police, and operational procedures of PSAPs and 
                                                 
67 “ISO 9001 Quality Management System: Business and Quality Management,” International 
Organization for Standards, 2011, http://www.standards.org/standards/listing/iso_9001.  
68 “Addressing Workgroup,” State of Minnesota, Metro GIS Policy Board, accessed July 16, 2014, 
http://metrogis.org/teams-governance/addressing-work-group.aspx.  
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offers dozens of standards; however, the following standards are the most relevant with 








 Data Structures & Management Documents 
  
02-010 Standard Legacy Data Formats For Data Exchange GIS 
Mapping 
Core Services 3/28/2011 
02-014 GIS Data Collection and Maintenance Standards Core Services 6/17/2007 
71-001 NG Additional Data Standard Core Services 9/17/2009 
71-501 Synchronizing Geographic Information System 
Databases with MSAG & ALI Information Document 
Core Services 9/8/2009 
71-502 An Overview of Policy Rules for Call Routing and 
Handling in NG Information Document 
Core Services 8/24/2010 
Table 1.   All NENA Standards 
 02-101—This standard recommends the use transmission control 
protocol/Internet protocol (TCP/IP) in the exchange of data 
 20-014—GIS Data collection provides a standard for archiving data and 
maintaining the databases in which the data will reside 
 71-001—This standard recommends that agencies size the databases to 
include additional information for later use, such as GPS data from patrol 
cars, address routing instructions, and additional premise information 
 71-502—This document describes an overview of how policy is defined, 
and the ways that they may be used. Policy rules influence the delivery of 
calls to a PSAP and how these calls are handled based on call-taker skill 
sets and other criteria. The governing authority defines and implements 
policy and rules. 
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C. ASSOCIATION OF PUBLIC-SAFETY COMMUNICATION 
PROFESSIONALS 
The Association of Public Safety Communications Officers (APCO) has far fewer 
published standards than NENA, but one in particular stands out as relative to 
information sharing, as it standardizes the naming conventions of the types of 
emergencies. The standard known as Public Safety Communications Common Incident 
Types for Data Exchange “focuses on providing a standardized list of Common Incident 
Type Codes to facilitate effective incident exchange between Next-Generation (NG) 
PSAPs and other authorized agencies, which is a critical component of public safety 
interoperability.”69 
If an agency is receiving incident information, a basic level of incident 
classification is required to assure the agency personnel understand the nature of the 
situation. The creation of this standardized incident type code list does not mean that the 
agency is required to change the codes it uses internally. The intent is to have each 
agency map its internal codes to the standardized list.”70 
D. NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 
Founded in 1901, the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is a 
non-regulatory federal agency within the U.S. Department of Commerce. NIST’s mission 
is to promote U.S. innovation and industrial competitiveness by advancing measurement 
science, standards, and technology in ways that enhance economic security and improve 
this nation’s quality of life.71 The most relevant NIST standard related to information 
sharing can be found in the Guidance to Promote Security Planning, and Secure System 
Operations and Administration. It is important, as it is the first standard in the review that 
mentions access for the private sector. 
                                                 
69 “Standards to Download,” The Association of Public-Safety Communications Officials (APCO), 
2014, https://www.apcointl.org/standards/apco-standards-for-download.html. 
70 Ibid. 
71 “NIST General Information,” National Institutes of Standards and Technology, updated April 2013, 
http://www.nist.gov/public_affairs/general_information.cfm.  
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…there is a need for timely, relevant, and easily accessible information to 
raise awareness about the risks, vulnerabilities and requirements for 
protection of information systems. This is particularly true for new and 
rapidly emerging technologies, which are being delivered with such 
alacrity by our industry.72 
E. AMERICAN NATIONAL STANDARDS INSTITUTE 
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) Homeland Defense and 
Security Standardization Collaborative (HDSSC) has released a roundtable report 
examining pressing standardization needs associated with the work of emergency 
preparedness and response practitioners, including public safety agencies, fire 
departments and law enforcement entities. The most relative standard from the ANSI is 
IEC 15415 Automatic Identification and Data Capture Techniques Package that defines 
an international format for data exchange. While not a required American standard, it 
would be prudent for agencies developing products to adhere to these standards in the 
event the agency integrates a foreign system in the public safety network.  
  
                                                 
72 Karen H. Brown, Deputy Director, “National Institute of Standards and Technology, Technology 
Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce before the Committee on Government Reform, 
Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology,” National Institute of Standards 
and Technology, March 9, 2000, http://www.nist.gov/director/ocla/testimony/brown-030900.cfm.  
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VI. CASE STUDIES 
A. REVERSE 911 
Systems generically known as Reverse 911 are excellent tools for notifying 
communities of threats that have lead time, such as a tornados and flooding. These events 
are sometimes predictable, as forecasters can observe these events developing, which 
gives PSAP employees time to prepare and launch notifications for looming events.  
These systems generally do not require much effort to install and maintain, as 
they are hosted systems and the hardware and software maintenance costs are part of the 
contracted services. The PSAP manager has some control over the on-going costs by 
updating the telephone number database on a less frequent basis; the risk is operating the 
system with less accurate data. The problem with utilizing less accurate data is that 
residents or businesses that may have moved into any of the potential zones are omitted 
from the notifications. The more frequently the telephone database is updated, the more 
accurate are the telephone numbers in the potential notification zones; however, a higher 
maintenance cost does occur due to the level of effort to update the database. Most 
PSAPs have access to reverse notification systems and communities have come to expect 
these services from their municipal governments.  
This thesis argues that reverse notification systems are not the ideal solutions for 
quick public safety tactical event notifications primarily due to the requirement of human 
intervention. Tactical neighborhood notifications are generally conducted after incidents 
have been reported to 911, responders have been dispatched, tactical radio channels have 
been established, and all the first responders have arrived on the scene, ready to take 
action. Launching neighborhood notifications are generally an afterthought once a first 
responder or incident commander realizes that the neighborhood, a nearby school, or 
businesses must be made aware of the incident.  
The actual time required to set up a neighborhood notification includes the 
transfer of messaging from the incident commander, the PSAP employees’ time for 
inputting the message into the system, developing the target neighborhood boundaries, 
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testing the message for accuracy, and then actually launching the message. Based on the 
size of the message, and the number of households that must be contacted, the actual 
launch can last from five minutes to more, and at times, more than 45 minutes. The 
author, speaking from personal experience, has observed notification processes that take 
as long as 60 minutes to complete.  
Reverse 911 processing time should be measured from the onset of the 
emergency. Other factors that impact the delivery of the message to all residents in the 
targeted area include the duration of the message, the geographic size of the event, and 
the capacity of the telephone company infrastructure. Telephone company switching 
centers or central offices can be choke points for telephone messaging. These 
neighborhood notification systems work well when the PSAP employees have time to 
develop a crisp and concise message and time for it to be delivered prior to the 
emergency.  
B. AUTOMATED CAD SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY REPORTS 
1. Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) 
The Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) is a multi-jurisdictional fusion 
center staffed by local, state, and federal agencies managed by the Colorado State Patrol 
(CSP). The CIAC was established in response to the attacks on September 11 with the 
goal to “prevent, protect against, respond to, recover from and prosecute acts of 
terrorism.”73 The CIAC is the single point of data collection, analysis, and distribution of 
terrorism-related information in the form of a daily, or more frequent when necessary, 
updates, bulletins, and reports to public safety agencies across the state of Colorado.74  
The main objectives of the CIAC are to provide tactical, strategic collection, 
analysis, and dissemination of information to local, state, and federal public safety 
agencies; maintain a terrorism warning communication system; document and 
disseminate an on-going threat analysis for the state; create and publish intelligence 
                                                 
73 “Colorado Information Analysis Center,” State of Colorado, Official State Web Portal, accessed 
July 13, 2014, http://www.colorado.gov/cs/Satellite/StatePatrol-Main/CBON/1251594440125.  
74 Ibid. 
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products for local public safety stakeholders; liaison with the FBI JTTF, and the U.S. 
Attorney’s Office of Anti-Terrorism Task Force; provide training to intelligence 
consumers, including police officers, firefighters and other first responders; and 
communicate information sharing initiatives, progress, and successes to stakeholders in 
order to foster collaboration. This last objective is the basis of this case study. 
The vast majority of actionable information sent to the CIAC is from detectives 
and investigators from law enforcement entities law enforcement agencies across the 
state. The FBI sends information to the CIAC, as does the U.S. Attorney Office and other 
fusion centers across the country; what is missing is local information from first 
responders working the streets. 
In 2011, the leaders of the CIAC approached a statewide body of PSAP managers 
and implored them to send information categorized as suspicious activity report (SAR) to 
the CIAC as the events were occurring. The proposal was that if a particular event were 
happening in one jurisdiction, the CIAC’s leadership team was certain that the same type 
or similar criminal activities could be occurring in neighboring jurisdictions sometimes 
literally across the street. The CIAC would then facilitate the communication to the other 
jurisdictions in an effort to expedite communication, foster collaboration, and reduce 
crime. In true government fashion, a form was presented to submit information. 
The reception from the PSAP managers was lukewarm and it was apparent that 
the CIAC’s request was going to be largely ignored not because it was a bad idea; the 
level of effort was outside the scope the PSAP manager’s jobs and it was just one more 
thing that already busy dispatchers would be asked to do. It was not a reasonable request. 
Within a week of the PSAP manager’s meeting, the CIAC leadership team met with the 
Denver PSAP managers, and in the 10 minutes of the meeting, the CIAC leaders were 
asking the management of Denver 911 to supply SAR incident information in real time. 
The request was that once a suspicious event had occurred, a PSAP employee would 
complete a form and fax it to the CIAC; again, another unreasonable expectation for an 
already busy communication center.  
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The Denver PSAP manages more than one million calls per year with a staff of 
less than 150 employees. Therefore, the likelihood of Denver reporting significant events 
to the CIAC was highly unlikely. The management team could agree to make those calls, 
but doing so would create an unfulfilled expectation, and ultimately, damage the working 
relationship. The simplest solution to providing CAD to the CIAC was to place a CAD 
terminal in the CIAC, but once the call volume was assessed, it was determined Denver 
would be delivering haystacks to the CIAC when the CIAC needed needles. This solution 
was neither feasible nor acceptable; again, due to the call volume handled by the Denver 
PSAP. Watching the volume of CAD data in an attempt to pick out the salient events 
would be a full-time job for a CIAC analyst.  
Rather than denying the sharing of real time information the Denver team asked 
the CAD information technology (IT) support team to join the meeting to determine 
whether or not data could be sent automatically to the CIAC in real time, and following a 
series of meetings, the CIAC and Denver teams were able to automate notifications to the 
CIAC. The second proposal was more acceptable to the CIAC team, although it 
represented some effort by the Denver IT team. Information from each 911-telephone call 
received is entered into CAD by 911 call-takers and then assigned a “nature code,” i.e., 
an in-progress burglary is assigned the nature code “Burg.” The teams developed 
business rules that would be used to create a report, specifically about suspicious activity. 
The CAD IT team would utilize the CAD API to export data and create a report in Excel, 
convert it to a portable document format (PDF), and then email the resulting report to the 
CIAC automatically.  
Phase One of the project was simple; the information from any CAD incident that 
was nature coded as “suspicious occurrence” would be automatically sent to the CIAC 
analysts.The information would include the fundamentals of information that call-takers 
were already trained to obtain, including the location of the incident, the caller’s name, a 
call back telephone number, and any of the narrative entered into the CAD incident by 
the call-taker. Entering this required no additional effort by the call-taker or the 
dispatcher, and no one had to remember to send the information to the CIAC. 
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In addition, the CIAC would receive the names of the officers dispatched to the 
event and the outcome of the police officer’s investigation. The Denver management 
team agreed to send the information to the CIAC with the stipulation that the CIAC 
analysts would not call the employees at Denver 911 to obtain additional information that 
may or may not be in the CAD incident. The CIAC analysts would follow-up with the 
police officers or the victims of the crimes, if appropriate. This project rolled out without 
any problems, and to the knowledge of any of the participants, absolutely no law 
enforcement information leaks occurred.  
The CIAC team was able to handle the amount of information being forwarded 
from the Denver 911 CAD system and was ready to enhance the business rules to meet 
the needs of the CIAC. The teams met again to review the progress and the CIAC team’s 
satisfaction with the CAD SARs report. The level of effort involved with the 
development of automating the SAR report was 23 hours of IT technician time, estimated 
at $23.73 per hour for a total of $545.79. Emailing the report to the Denver Police 
Department (DPD) officers working in the intelligence division so that they can 
immediately follow up with the officer who handled the incident is an unexpected 
outcome of using the CAD SAR report.  
In the past seven months, the CIAC analysts have been able to attribute numerous 
successes to the automatic CAD SAR report, including the development of 27 officer 
safety intelligence briefs disseminated to eight neighboring jurisdictions, the arrests of 
seven individuals with felony warrants, the recovery of six stolen handguns, and the 
recovery of stolen equipment issued to police officers, including uniforms, badges, a 
Tazer, and a long gun. These results were due to sending the CIAC breadcrumbs and the 
CIAC analysts working with a variety of police agencies in the Denver metropolitan area. 
2. Connect and Protect® 
The main responsibilities of 911 employees, police officers, paramedics, and fire 
personnel are to mitigate emergencies. While neighborhood notifications are critical, they 
are an afterthought. Due to the nature of the event being handled, public safety personnel 
are already busy stabilizing the event, and notifications become a second thought. It is not 
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that the public safety practitioners take the task of notifications lightly; they are just 
extremely busy. One of the best ways to handle emergency notifications with an 
acceptable level of consistency is for them to be done automatically, essentially taking 
the human intervention out of the equation. 
Portland 911 (Oregon) collaborated with several private technology companies 
led by Swan Island Networks in association with Redlands, Calif.-based ESRI, FORTiX, 
and TripWire. The application known as Connect and Protect
®
 automatically pulled 
information from the Portland 911 CAD system and sent in-progress emergency 
information over an encrypted Internet connection to credentialed subscribers based on 
the proximity of the school or business location to the emergency. Not all users received 
all the information. Only those subscribers in close proximity to the emergency received 
the information.  
The BETA version of Connect and Protect
®
 was intended to notify school 
administrators and business owners located near emergencies with a goal of providing 
real-time information to help principals and safety managers make better decisions to 
maintain the safety of the buildings’ occupants. In the first six months of operation, 
Portland 911 and Connect and Protect
®
 sent 60,000 automatic alerts. 
The system was well received by the Portland school district and several of the 
local businesses and Connect and Protect® was credited for notifying the Lloyd Street 
Shopping Mall security team for locking gunmen out of the mall following a burglary 
allegedly committed by them at a nearby bank. The program was recognized by the 
Kennedy School of Government at Harvard for innovation and received an award in the 
category of improving homeland security. Swan Island Networks and Portland 911 went 
their separate ways at the beginning of the recession; Portland 911 stopped working with 
Swan Island, and Connect and Protect ®was developed into a more advanced product. 
Seven years after Connect and Protect®, the application developed by Swan 
Island Networks was considerably improved. The company has expanded its customer 
base, entered into commercial partnerships, including with Microsoft, and launched a 
new product in 2010. 
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3. Trusted Information Exchange Services® 
Swan Island launched a new software called Trusted Information Exchange 
Services® (TIES) that was developed for organizations using Microsoft CityNext. In 
February, CityNext, an initiative Microsoft started last July to create smart cities 
worldwide, partnered with Swan Island to help departments within city governments to 
communicate better with one another.  
The product creates a real-time dashboard that allows municipal leaders to see an 
overview of city metrics, which provides situational awareness and the advantage of 
situational awareness. Denver is a pilot site for the improved Connect and Protect 
application. TIES® has monitored Denver CAD and issued alerts during past three years, 
and for the past 12 months, Denver 911 has used TIES to distribute its data to trusted 
partners including the CIAC, which in turn, verifies the data and then distributes critical 
information and products to law enforcement in neighboring communities. Denver PSAP 
employees monitor TIES® maps providing real-time situational awareness of the city. 
The system permits them also to share that data with other agencies in real time. 
At the center of TIES is the Common Operating Picture, which shows real-time 
data from a variety of sources fused in various maps on dashboards. It can display the 
latest information about severe weather, road closures, health scares, electricity outages, 
fire conflagrations, and cyber attacks, for instance. TIES works in two phases. First, it 
gathers data from hundreds of sources, such as social media, local 911 centers, NWS 
bulletins, intelligence analysis, and even the locations of school buses, using global 
positioning system (GPS) tracking. Second, it filters the information based on individual 
preferences and delivers updates on dashboards, as an email, text, or phone call alerts. 
It also uses the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP), “a digital format for 
exchanging emergency alerts that allows a consistent alert message to be disseminated 
simultaneously over many different communications systems,” according to the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 
For example, a school administrator might desire access to information about 
pedophiles living nearby, breaking crime news, and gang activity. However, many 
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schools lack the security resources to address all these threats, so they rely on a close 
relationship with local police departments. 
Similarly, principals can monitor the location and type of emergency calls to 
determine whether the nearby incidents could affect the school. Implementing TIES 
requires access to a secure connection and must be vetted by law enforcement personnel.  
4. CAD-to-CAD Interfaces 
Improving situational awareness is a common objective for many PSAP managers 
and sharing CAD information with adjacent PSAPs is one way to do it. Some PSAPs are 
literally located across the street from a neighboring jurisdiction PSAP, and surprisingly, 
due to the silo business model, those communication centers often have no idea of what 
emergencies are being handled by the neighboring PSAPs. Sheriff Deputies actually 
respond through municipal areas, drive using emergency lights and sirens, and pass idle 
city police cars. The agency may be sending its closest responder, but the closest resource 
from an adjacent jurisdiction is not being dispatched due to the silo mentality. This 
situation is not a new dilemma.  
A recent trend is to connect CAD systems to create a common operation platform 
so that one PSAP can interface seamlessly with the neighboring jurisdiction with the 
objective of sharing information in an effort to identify the closest first responder 
visually. No doubt exists that having the capability to move information between 
disparate CAD systems can save precious time, and in the dispatch business, saving time 
means saving lives.  
Another objective of a CAD-to-CAD (C2C) system interface is to connect PSAPs 
to expedite the dispatch of emergency calls for service by avoiding transferring the 
telephone caller, a time intensive task that generally confuses the caller. The call-taker 
who answers the 911 call can input all the required information without transferring the 
caller. Due to the C2C interface, programming the CAD incident is directed to the correct 
PSAP. It is common to find numerous PSAPs clustered in metropolitan service areas, 
such as Santa Clara County, the City of Denver, the Phoenix-Mesa metropolitan area, and 
the Portland, Oregon metropolitan area. These areas are excellent prospects for C2C 
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projects.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) selected these agencies for the 
purposes of the Computer Aided Dispatch Interoperability Project, as these regions were 
“the closest to implementing multi-jurisdictional CAD interoperability solutions in a real-
world environment.”75 
Currently, if one of the dispatch centers receives a call for service in another 
jurisdiction, it interrogates the caller to determine the location of the event, the caller’s 
name, the caller’s telephone number, and obtains a brief description of what is occurring. 
Once determined that the caller is outside the call-taker’s jurisdiction, the caller is 
transferred to the correct agency and the destination call-taker will begin the same line of 
interrogation, which wastes precious minuses and frustrates the telephone caller. The 
transferring of 911 callers from PSAP to PSAP occurs on a daily basis.  
The Santa Clara project is currently in the pilot phase to connect disparate fire 
CAD systems across San Jose, Milpitas, and Santa Clara County, and when fully 
implemented, will connect 13 fire agencies in the region. The goal is to send the closest, 
most appropriate fire responders to medical emergencies and structure fires, irrespective 
of the home jurisdiction. This project should improve response times and patient care.  
The Phoenix-Mesa Metro Area project is currently sharing event information and 
unit information for fire agencies across separate CAD systems. A CAD-to-CAD 
interface using the same CAD system with an integrated interface is most likely to 
succeed, as both agencies share the exact system components and standards. These 
interfaces are based on similar CAD systems avoiding conflicting and proprietary 
operating systems that utilize the same geographic system and database structure. While 
robust and dependable, these systems work as long as all agency CAD systems remain 
constant and on the save software version. Denver 911 and the Denver International 
Airport Communication/Dispatch Center is a good example of the use of this interface.  
The benefit of this type of interface is that irrespective of where the 911 telephone 
for service is received, the answering 911 call-taker handles the call from start to finish, 
                                                 
75 “Computer-Aided Dispatch Interoperability Project: Documentation of Regional Efforts,” 
Department of Homeland Security, August 2008, http://www.npstc.org/documents/Computer 
AidedDispatchDocumentationofEfforts.pdf.  
 42 
and when done, enters the incident information into the CAD system. The system 
recognizes the geographic location of the event and sends the call automatically to the 
correct dispatch center and the correct dispatcher within the center with no inconvenience 
to the telephone caller; inconvenience being measured in having the telephone call 
transferred to a different government agency.  
The third type of C2C interface utilizes a translation bus that requires each 
jurisdiction to write system code to the common operation platform. The translations 
between the various CAD systems is done on the bus, a mechanism that acts as a black 
box to translate the disparate CAD commands, information and data, and is considered to 
be more robust that the hard-wired interfaces, but not as robust as the point-to-point C2C 
using similar hardware, firmware, and software versions. The bus was the solution put 
into place in the Portland Metropolitan area. The bus was designed to manage data traffic 
from seven PSAPs and four CAD different systems through two states along a 56-mile 
corridor.  
Each agency in the region relies on differing technologies to support its public 
safety needs. The proposed solution must be able to adapt to changing hardware, 
operating system, and software platforms, as well as varying data communications 
methods. The annual cost to maintain the project exceeded $1.1M with no dedicated 
funding mechanism; it was not a sustainable project.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
C. TECHNOLOGY ADVANCEMENTS 
The need for public safety interoperability and data sharing came to the forefront 
following the attacks in September 2001. Government reports, academic studies, and the 
media were all critical that nobody noticed that the lights were blinking but no one took 
any action.  It is encouraging that technology and the concept of the “need to share” have 
begun to weave their way into the objective to protect the homeland. The federal decision 
makers have taken far too long to recognize that the public safety sector can play a large 
role in the protecting the country. However, that role is also beginning to evolve.  
The technology and ease of using it has improved exponentially and the cost for 
implementing commercial-off–the-shelf (COTS) hardware has made advances in 
information sharing easier on budgets. Proprietary systems on the other hand may have 
become more affordable, but in lean economic times, these systems are generally not 
sustainable and studies have found that industrial usage of personal handheld devices is 
not effective.  
D. THE BEST REASON TO SHARE INFORMATION: SITUATIONAL 
AWARENESS 
Situational awareness is a term that simply means understanding the dynamics in 
the current situation. It is the ability to look at a huge variety of data, determine what is 
relevant, synthesize the data, and act on it. In a mass-casualty event or public health 
emergency, “situational awareness is the ability to collect the correct information, 
analyze it, and project what will come next so the appropriate actions can be taken.”76  
To achieve situational awareness, we have to get that right information to 
the right person who’s prepared to receive it, who can analyze it and do 
something with it.77 
—Eric Toner, Pittsburgh Medical Center 
                                                 
76 “Computer-Aided Dispatch Interoperability Project: Documentation of Regional Efforts.” 
77 Institute of Medicine, “Medical Surge Capacity: Workshop Summary,” The National Academies 
Press, 2010, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK32860/.  
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS 
E. THE MOST EFFECTIVE RETURN ON INVESTMENT INFORMATION 
SHARING TOOL 
The desire to share information with adjacent agencies and public safety 
stakeholders, such as businesses and schools, is a decision that agency leaders must 
make. If the agency chooses not to share information, it is a conscious business decision 
and is the agency’s prerogative. Agencies that desire to share information with their 
partnering agencies and public safety stakeholders must determine the business needs of 
the communities. In moderately dense metropolitan areas, a C2C interface may produce 
the best results for the first responders and the communities they serve, and recognize 
that costs are associated with the collaboration.  
The best opportunity and cost effective information-sharing model from PSAPs is 
the CAD report generating application developed for the Colorado Information Analysis 
Center. The project cost less than $600 to implement and according to the deputy 
manager at the CIAC, “the information coming from Denver 911 closed the 
informational gaps and effectively shared information across the public sectors and peer 
to peer. The Denver 911 CAD generated SAR reports have helped the CIAC analysts 
solve eleven crimes that would have otherwise been classified as cold calls.78 “The 
Denver 911 SAR reports have helped investigators to recover weapons used in felony 
crimes, recover drugs and stolen property.”79 
F. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
If mutual interest warrants enhancing the CIAC SAR project, the teams may want 
to include adding intelligence channels or helping customize existing operational 
dashboards to include additional performance metrics. The CIAC management is 
interested in finding ways to determine how Denver collects data and is interested sharing 
                                                 




it with other law enforcement agencies in the region, ultimately to combine that effort 
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